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ABSTRACT
The current research aims at providing evidence concerning the influence 
of surplus free cash flow (SFCF) and stock market segmentations (SMS) on 
income-increasing earnings management practices in Jordan. The results, 
based on a sample of all non-financial companies that were listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2013 to 2017, confirm the research 
hypotheses. The Huber-White’s sandwich standard errors for random-
effects regression was used as the primary statistical tool for this study. The 
findings revealed a significant and positive association between SFCF and 
income-boosting discretionary accruals (DAC). As well, the results found 
that SMS was significantly and positively associated with the positive DAC. 
This research adds value to scholarship by investigating the impact of SMS 
variable on earnings management. To the best available knowledge, this 
relationship has not been examined either in Jordan or elsewhere in the 
world. Further, this is the first empirical attempt to investigate the effect 
of SFCF on earnings management in Jordan, which provides meaningful 
information for companies seeking to understand and reduce agency 
problems within the Jordanian context.
Keywords: Earnings management; DAC; surplus free cash flow; SFCF; 
stock market segmentations; SMS; agency theory; institutional theory; 
Jordan.
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INTROduCTION
Accounting system gives the managers control of the selection and offers 
opportunities for the managers to use the discretion that is contained in that 
system to determine earnings in the direction of achieving their objectives 
(Fang, Huang, & Karpoff, 2016). Earnings management reduces the 
reliability of the reported earnings which in turn masks the real performance 
of the company (Soliman & Ragab, 2014), distorts earnings quality, and 
diminishes trust in the financial reports (Saleem, Alifiah, & Tahir, 2016). As 
a result, shareholders have been losing the trust in the integrity of accounting 
figures, which led to growing attention to the quality of earnings among 
researchers (Barkhordar & Tehrani, 2016).
The earnings management phenomenon became a global issue facing 
the accounting profession and has grown over the past twenty years and 
continues to be of interest to scholars (Alves, 2012; Hashim, Salleh, & 
Ariff, 2013). Corporate collapses like; Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, 
Satyam Computer Services, and Arthur Anderson have strongly indicated 
that the many of today’s companies are engaging in earnings manipulation 
(Rani, Hussain, & Chand, 2013). In the Jordanian context, several financial 
corporate scandals like Shamayleh Gate have occurred (Alzoubi, 2018). 
Indeed, Zureigat, Fadzil, and Ismail (2014) stated that several Jordanian 
firms had tricked Jordanian banks to obtain around one billion US dollars as 
credit facilities, which, in turn, had triggered corporate financial collapses 
in Jordan. Consistent with this notion, some studies (e.g., Abbadi, Hijazi, 
& Al-Rahahleh, 2016; Al-khabash & Al-Thuneibat, 2008; Al Qallap, 2014; 
Alqatamin, Aribi, & Arun, 2017; E. Alzoubi, 2016) have documented that 
the earnings management of the Jordanian companies listed in the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) was high compared with an acceptable level of 
discretionary accruals (DAC).
According to ASE (2018), there was a notable drop in the number of 
listed companies on ASE, which was attributable to the delisting of 37 non-
financial companies by virtue of the listing securities directives during the 
period of 2013-2017. JSC (2018) stated that 28 of these delisted companies 
had violated the provisions of Securities Law concerning financial reporting 
practices. Accordingly, these violations indicate that listed companies are 
unable to provide accurate financial statements to their shareholders, which, 
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in turn, points out that earnings manipulation is a matter of concern in the 
Jordanian context.
 
In Jordan, two potential variables may lead to engaging in earnings 
management practices. Public shareholding companies are usually monitored 
for compliance with regulations, and most of these regulations are linked to 
financial ratios, which results in creating pressure on managers to manipulate 
the reported earnings (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2015). Indeed, numerous 
researchers have documented that these regulations create motivations to 
manage the financial statements (Kassem, 2018; Pereira & Alves, 2017). 
Consequently, the first variable revolves around the classification of the 
listed securities in ASE, along with the distinction granted to a particular 
market. As of October 1, 2012, the board of directors of ASE issued decision 
number (33/2012), which stated that the price thresholds of the traded 
stocks increased to ± 7.5% instead of ± 5% of the last traded price, and this 
advantage only applied to companies listed in the first market. The price 
threshold for the companies listed in the second and third market remained at 
±5% of the last traded price (ASE, 2017). Based on this new regulation, the 
first market would be more favourable for shareholders because this indicates 
that companies listed in that market are profitable and reputable as well as 
they are differentiated in the allowed stock price movements. Accordingly, 
listed companies might be interested in being listed in the first market due 
to its privileges and to preserve the competitiveness, through managing their 
earnings upwardly so they can satisfy the condition of achieving a particular 
earnings limit. Thus, the purpose of the current research is to investigate the 
influence of the stock market segmentations (SMS) on income-increasing 
earnings management for the initial time in scholarship.
The second variable is the free cash flow that Jordanian companies 
hold. The substantial growth in cash holdings of corporations across the 
globe has stimulated the interest of scholars (Moez & Amina, 2018; Nguyen 
& Nguyen, 2018). Management worldwide has increased their cash holdings 
during the past twenty years considerably. In a 2014 report, Deloitte noted 
that the top 1000 global non-financial companies were holding $2.8 trillion 
in cash. These numbers demonstrate that cash holdings are essential to 
companies and worthy of being examined (Amess, Banerji, & Lampousis, 
2015). In particular, Al-Amarneh (2015) reported that Jordanian firms listed 
on the ASE were holding cash within the global range. Further, T. Alzoubi 
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(2016) stated that the non-financial companies listed on ASE hold a large 
volume of cash and cash equivalents, and he concluded that cash is valued at 
a discount in Jordan, where the free cash flow and agency problems existed 
among companies listed on the ASE. Thus. In a state of affairs in which a firm 
has a surplus free cash flow (SFCF) after all profitable projects have been 
financed, managers may invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects for 
their benefits, and then they practise earnings manipulation using accounting 
discretion to cover up the outcome of their insufficient investments (Chung, 
Firth, & Kim, 2005; Shadmehri, Khansalar, Giannopoulos, & Dasht-
Bayaz, 2017). Therefore, this study aims at examining whether companies 
listed on ASE with high SFCF are engaged in income-increasing earnings 
management for the first time in Jordan.
Statistically speaking, the models and statistical techniques used in 
the present research will add to the extension of literature. Most previous 
research on earnings management have used cross-sectional or time series 
analysis, but this research utilizes panel data analysis. Specifically, the 
major studies that have investigated the influence of SFCF on DAC have 
not employed panel data analysis especially in developing countries (see, 
Astami, Rusmin, Hartadi, & Evans, 2017; Bhundia, 2012; Bukit & Iskandar, 
2009; Cardoso, Martinez, & Teixeira, 2014).
LITERaTuRE REvIEw aNd hyPOThESES 
dEvELOPMENT
Earnings management
Earnings management originated when commercial exchanges 
commenced (Ramírez-Orellana, Martínez-Romero, & Marino-Garrido, 
2017). Healy (1985) originated the study of managing earnings by means 
of the usage of accruals. He concluded that accruals modified the timing 
of reported earnings. Further, changes in accounting procedures and 
accrual policies that managers use can be influenced by earnings-based 
bonus schemes, which managers used to improve their remunerations. 
Subsequently, studying “accruals” has been become the focus of many 
scholars (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991; Sayari & Omri, 
2017).
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Franceschetti (2018) noted that finding a clear definition of the 
term “earnings management” was challenging in the practical literature. 
According to Ramírez-Orellana et al. (2017), Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
provided the most widely cited definition of earnings management. They said 
that “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (p. 368).
With respect to the types of earnings management, Based on their 
review of the extant literature, Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2008) 
classified earnings management into several kinds of such management 
based on different perspectives, including its legitimacy, direction, the effect 
on cash flow, and management intent. The challenge for scholars is not only 
unveiling earnings management but also documenting it convincingly. To 
meet this challenge scholars have to begin with identifying the conditions 
and causes, which block motivations channels and therefore eliminate 
earnings manipulation practices (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Kighir, Omar, 
& Mohamed, 2013; Toumeh & Yahya, 2019). The literature of earnings 
management strives to grasp why managers are manipulating earnings 
(McNichols, 2000).
In this line, research on earnings management motivations is divided 
into two groups; the first group of researchers (Chen & Sheng, 2013; Hashim 
et al., 2013; Ming-Chia, 2012) contended that the incentives of earnings 
management could stem from attitudes and convictions. They have studied 
three motivations that lead to earnings management from the perspective 
of behaviour, namely, altruistic motivation (resulted from the intention to 
benefit the company), speculative motivation (resulted from the intention 
to obtain personal gain), and pressure from affiliated parties (generated by 
the desire of meeting external expectation). A second group of researchers 
(Habbash & Alghamdi, 2015; Rani et al., 2013; Yanqiong, 2011), who 
followed Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) classification scheme, concluded 
that four types of motivations might induce managers to exercise earnings 
management. These motivations are capital market motivations, lending 
contract motivations, management compensation contracts motivations, 
and regulatory motivations. 
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Measuring managerial discretion over earnings is an essential factor 
for detecting earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols, 
2000) because managers depend on their ability to utilize the applications 
of discretionary accounting regarding certain accruals to manage earnings 
(Arkan, 2015). Many previous empirical studies have used discretionary 
(abnormal) accruals as a proxy to detect earnings management (Chowdhury, 
Mollah, & Al Farooque, 2018; Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Teoh, 
Welch, & Wong, 1998).
Relationship between Stock Market Segmentations  
and Earnings Management
The ASE comprises two basic markets: the primary market, in which 
securities are issued; and the secondary market, in which securities are 
traded. The secondary market contains three sub-markets: the first, second, 
and third market. This segmentation is similar to many other countries that 
have separated their exchange market via various listing requirements. 
For example, United States (Ward, Yin, & Zeng, 2018), United Kingdom 
(Khurshed, Kostas, Mohamed, & Saadouni, 2018), Malaysia (Sulong, 
Gardner, Hussin, Mohd Sanusi, & McGowan, 2013), Singapore (Nguyen, 
Locke, & Reddy, 2014), Japan (Honjo & Nagaoka, 2018), and China, 
(Sarkar, 2016).
Chen and Yuan (2004) highlighted that listed firms in China are 
mandated to follow guidelines for IPOs, right issues, and delisting. 
Particularly, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires 
listed companies to satisfy specific requirements before permitting them to 
issue additional shares to the existing shareholders. One requirement is to 
reach a minimum of 10% return on equity (ROE) yearly in the preceding 
three years. They found that Chinese firms utilized earnings management 
practices to achieve the accounting threshold value. Haw, Qi, Wu, and 
Wu (2005) documented that the management of listed Chinese companies 
employed income-increasing accounting accruals to satisfy regulatory 
requirements of the stock rights issues. Comparable results were published 
by previous research such as Yu, Du, and Sun (2006), Yang (2015), and 
Lento and Yeung (2017).
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Jaggi, Chin, Lin, and Lee (2006) indicated that a regulation that the 
Taiwan Securities and Futures Exchange Commission (TSFEC) issued 
mandated IPO firms to report annual earnings forecasts for two years before 
stock rights offerings with a 20% forecast error threshold. The results 
revealed that the managers of IPO firms manipulate their earnings, so they 
do not deviate from the predicted earnings. Further, similar results have 
been found in France (Cormier & Martinez, 2006) and Malaysia (Ismail & 
Weetman, 2008). Based on a comparative analysis of 571 IPOs of United 
Kingdom firms listed on Alternative Investment Market and Main Market, 
Alhadab, Clacher, and Keasey (2016) highlighted that the Main Market of 
London Stock Exchange requires IPO companies to have a minimum of 
75% of their business must report earnings records. The study showed that 
the regulatory environment in the United Kingdom influenced management 
accounting choices through both real activities and accruals manipulation. 
In the Middle East, Makhaiel and Sherer (2017) indicated that the Egyptian 
regulatory requirements produce pressure on companies that seek to satisfy 
listing and delisting rules. They found that the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
regulatory requirements were influential incentives for management to 
adjust the reported earnings in financial statements upwardly to remain 
listed in the stock market.
In the Jordanian context, listing requirements of ASE differ depending 
on whether a company will be listed on the first, second or third market. The 
first market in which trading takes place in shares of the listed companies has 
listing requirements as stipulated in regulations. Companies listed in ASE 
are confronted with specific listing criteria. Under the provisions of “Article 
(72) of the Securities Law No. 76 of 2002” and the provisions of “Article 
(24.B.1) of the Internal Bylaw of the ASE of 2004,” the requirements of 
the first market in terms of earnings are the following. The listing of the 
company’s shares is transferred to the first market if a company has net 
profits before tax for a minimum of two years of the three years before the 
transfer of listing, provided the company’s average net pre-tax profit for the 
latest three years are at least 5% of the company’s paid-in capital. According 
to decision number 33/2012 of ASE`s board of directors; companies listed 
in the first market have the privilege of being allowed more flexible stock 
price thresholds, which is ±7.5% of the last traded price, while other listed 
companies are allowed with only ±5% of the last traded price (ASE, 2017).
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In the same vein, Yanqiong (2011) stated that Chinese firms that 
have received special treatment (ST) or particular transfer (PT) would 
lose some of their reputations and competitiveness with other listed firms, 
and shareholders will view them unfavourably. Also, Zhang et al. (2012) 
indicated that, when the shares of a listed Chinese firm were labelled with 
special treatment (ST) status, the trading and financial activities of that 
firm’s shares will be restricted, and it will be not permitted to have more 
than a 5% of their stock price thresholds in either direction and also they 
will be prohibited from issuing additional shares. In the same manner, 
Cheng, Aerts, and Jorissen (2010) and Zhang, Mahenthiran, and He 
Huang (2012) concluded that loss makers are induced to manipulate their 
reported earnings using DAC to remove (ST) status. Likewise, the present 
study assumes that Jordanian companies that are transferred from the first 
market to the second/third market will suffer from the same issues. Most 
importantly, those companies will also be allowed with only 5% movement 
in their daily share prices.
According to institutional theory, earnings management motivations 
might be derived from the formal or informal pressures that may lead a 
company to make changes to shape itself compared to other companies 
(Habbash & Alghamdi, 2015). In this theory, requiring listed companies to 
reach a particular earnings limit is called coercive pressure, and this pressure 
may push the managers to use income-boosting earnings management to 
achieve legitimacy. Further, the institutional theory argues the mimetic 
pressures, which means that when companies fail to achieve the required 
earnings; they may manipulate their earnings to preserve competitiveness 
with their peers so they can be more reputable and favourable to their 
shareholders (Makhaiel & Sherer, 2017).
In view of the foregoing, the study assumes that companies listed in 
the other markets (second and third markets) are induced to obtain the 5% 
average net pre-tax profit of its paid-in capital in order to boost their ranking 
to the first market. In conclusion, this process may lead to incentivizing the 
managers of companies listed on the ASE to opt income-increasing earnings 
management practices. Therefore, the present study adds to the extant 
literature by formulating SMS as an independent variable in the research 
model, and hence develops the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: Stock market segmentation is positively related to 
income-increasing discretionary accruals.
Relationship between surplus free cash flow and earnings management
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed influential work in introducing a 
theory of the firm based upon the conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and corporate managers. Subsequently, Jensen (1986) developed the agency 
cost of free cash flow. He defined free cash flow as a “cash flow in excess 
of that required funding all projects that have positive net present values 
when discounted at the relevant cost of capital” (p. 323).
Cash holding is significant because it supplies companies with liquidity 
and the opportunity to grow their sales (Al-Amarneh, 2013). As well, free 
cash flow is also considered a significant resource for companies to maximize 
shareholders value (Shadmehri et al., 2017). Often, cash is employed, for 
example, in increasing dividends, developing new products, maintaining 
assets, reducing company’s debt, buying back stocks, or acquiring other 
companies (Alnawaiseh, Alomari, Al-Rawashdeh, and Alnawaiseh, 2017). 
Conversely, management may tend to hold the surplus cash flow under their 
control to preserve their power (Mansourlakoraj & Sepasi, 2015).
Agency theory posits that if managers and shareholders goals are not 
aligned, then managers are stimulated to invest free cash flow in projects 
at less than the cost of capital or waste the free cost flow on organizational 
inefficiencies (Habib, 2011; Jensen, 1986). In the absence of appropriate 
investment opportunities and presence of low-growth opportunities (Chung 
et al., 2005; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989), an over-investment is likely to arise 
(Nekhili, Amar, Chtioui, & Lakhal, 2016). Cheng and Wang (2014) and 
Wang, Zhu, and Hoffmire (2015) stated that firms with overinvestment 
activities have an increased probability of agency problem. In fact, if free 
cash flow is not utilized in the way to maximize the interest of shareholders, 
then the agency problem will exist (Fakhroni, Ghozali, Harto, & Yuyetta, 
2018).
Scholars have been investigated the earnings management practices 
in the situation of SFCF. For example, a research conducted by Jones and 
Sharma (2001) documented a positive relationship between free cash flow 
and earnings management in companies that were listed on the Australian 
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Securities Exchange. Using a large sample of 22,576 firm-year observations 
for companies listed in USA during 1984 and 1996, Chung et al. (2005) 
examined the relationship between SFCF and DAC. They reported that 
management used their discretion in choosing income-boosting DAC to 
hide the negative effects that resulted from their insufficient investments in 
negative NPV projects. Previous research by Bhundia (2012) (for India), 
Barkhordar and Tehrani (2016) (for Iran), Cardoso et al. (2014) (for Brazil), 
Bukit and Nasution (2015) (for Indonesia) have also found that the SFCF 
situation leads managers to engage in upward earnings management to 
obscure the consequences of their poor investments.
Low growth companies are more likely to invest their free cash 
flow in unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). This will lead to non-wealth-
maximizing activities, which will be reflected on company performance 
(Yaari, Nikiforov, Kahya, & Shachmurove, 2016), and these inefficient 
investments may lead to fire managers and a decline in the reported 
earnings (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). Hence, management may seek to mask 
these negative consequences by employing accounting discretion and 
accounting procedures (Chung et al., 2005). Strictly speaking, managers of 
low growth companies may utilize income-boosting earnings management 
to hide the real picture and provide better performance of a firm (Bhundia, 
2012; Shadmehri et al., 2017). Using this argument, this research posits the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Surplus free cash flow is positively related to income-
increasing discretionary accruals.
METhOdOLOgy 
Sample data and population
The number of listed companies on the ASE in 2017 was 194 listed 
companies, and they were categorized under two main sectors; financial 
and non-financial sectors, where the later includes two categories of 
industries (services and industrial). All companies in the financial sector 
are eliminated from the study for three reasons. First, this sector has a 
different working capital structure (Abed, Al-Attar, & Suwaidan, 2012). 
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Second, financial institutions have  unique financial statements that contain 
different components from those in the non-financial sector (Soliman & 
Ragab, 2014). Third, companies that are categorized under this sector are 
administered by different regulatory requirements (Noor, Sanusia, Heang, 
Iskandar, & Isa, 2015), which, in turn, may unduly affect the DAC (Rusmin, 
Astami, & Hartadi, 2014).
The study selects all non-financial companies listed on the ASE, 
considering that the financial reports of the selected companies must be 
available on the website and cover the period of 2013-2017. The non-
financial sector included 95 companies drawn from 18 different types of 
industries as they existed in the ASE website in December 2017.
The period of the study spanned from 2013 until 2017, since the 
announcement of the decision number (33/2012) of the board of directors 
of the ASE that promulgated the directives of the new market segmentations 
and stock price thresholds for the listed companies in ASE was released 
specifically on 30-09-2012. So, the time frame should not start before the 
year of 2013.
The data of this study were considered as a balanced panel data, in 
which the observations for each entity is the same. All the needed data 
in this study came from secondary data sources. Data related to earnings 
management, SFCF, and the control variables were gathered manually 
from the annual reports of the non-financial listed companies on the ASE. 
The data for measuring SMS variable were obtained from the ASE website 
which can be accessible at https://www.ase.com.jo/en.
Proxy for Earnings Management, Stock Market 
Segmentations, and Surplus Free Cash Flow
Earnings can be managed by using different means like DAC, that is 
a component of the total accruals, where it is used to capture the earnings 
management (Jones, 1991). To estimate the DAC, total accruals should be 
firstly calculated. Then, a specific model generates the nondiscretionary 
component of total accruals that leads to separate the two components of 
total accruals; discretionary and non-discretionary accruals of the reported 
earnings. The later reflects the non-manipulated accounting accruals items 
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because they are out of managers` control and they are expected to change 
with firms` underlying business activities (Dechow et al., 1995).
The modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) is viewed as the 
most powerful model to detect earnings management (Islam, Ali, & Ahmad, 
2011), and it has been used by the majority of previous researchers (Abed 
et al., 2012; Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Litt, Sharma, & 
Sharma, 2013; Rusmin et al., 2014). Sekaran and Bougie (2016) recommend 
that when a particular variable has many measures, it is better to use the 
most frequent measure in the literature. Thus, this study employed cross-
sectional modified Jones model to gauge the DAC as a proxy for earnings 
management.
There are two approaches to calculate the total accruals; balance 
sheet and cash flow statements. The later calculates total accruals as the 
difference between net income and cash flows from operating activities. 
However, the study used the balance sheet approach over the cash flows 
approach because the later excludes the accruals associated to the initial 
capitalization of property plant and equipment, which in turn makes it biased 
and incomplete (Larson, Sloan, & Zha Giedt, 2018).
As stated earlier, total accruals should firstly be calculated as a starting 
point. The study calculates total accruals using the balance sheet approach 
as the following: 
TAC= ∆CA- ∆Cash- ∆CL+ ∆DCL- DEP (1)
Where:
TAC = Total accruals in year t,
∆CA = Change in current assets in year t,
∆Cash = Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t,
∆CL = Change in current liabilities in year t,
∆DCL  = Change in short term debt included in current liabilities in 
year t,
DEP = Depreciation and amortization expense in year t.
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Second, the cross-sectional modified Jones model with constant for 
every industry is defined below to estimate the non-discretionary accruals:
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ε� = Residuals. 
As shown above, each variable included in the model was standardized by the book value of total assets A��� in order to mitigate heteroscedasticity. Also, the constant term was added to the model as Kothari, 
Leone, and Wasley (2005) recommended to alleviate the misspecification problems that the 
heteroscedasticity issue caused as they dicovered that the notion that a constant enhances the power 
of the model. 
Third, after estimating alphas (α�,α� and α�) in the second equation, the non-discretionary accruals will 
be estimated as below: 
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Where: NDAC = Non-discretionary accruals divided by the lagged total assets. 
 Finally, discretionary accruals will be calculated as the following: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� = 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� − 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�                                                                                                                                                                        (4) 
The SMS variable in this study is a dummy variable and takes 1 if a company is listed in other markets 
(second and third market), and 0 if a company is listed in the first market. The study included the second 
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The SMS variable in this study is a dummy variable and takes 1 if 
a company is listed in other markets (second and third market), and 0 if a 
company is listed in the first market. The study included the second and 
third market as other markets for three reasons. First, both markets have 
no listing requirements in respect of earnings. Second, both markets have 
the same stock price thresholds (±5 %). Third, on 16th of April 2017 the 
third market was cancelled by the provisions of Article (29) of the Listing 
Directives for the year 2016.
So far, no unanimity exists among the scholars on how to measure 
free cash flow (Bhandari & Adams, 2017). It can be noted that most of the 
researchers who examined the effect of SFCF on earnings management 
have adopted the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) model to measure free cash flow 
(Bhundia, 2012; Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; Cardoso et al., 2014). Following 
these empirical studies, the current study measures free cash flow by 
deducting expenses like tax expense, interest expense, and dividends on 
ordinary and preferred shares from operating income before depreciation, 
standardized by dividing it with total assets as in the following formula: 
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In the scholarship, the free cash flow problem is commonly aligned with low growth opportunities 
(Jensen, 1986; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). Companies with low growth opportunities and high free cash 
flow are more likely to invest in negative NPV projects that only maximize the wealth of managers while 
ignoring the interests of shareholders (Habib, 2011; Nouri & Gilaninia, 2017). In this way, the current 
study determines SFCF situation by employing two proxies, which are the free cash flow and the growth 
opportunities of the firm identified by price to book ratio (Shadmehri et al., 2017). The SFCF is a dummy 
variable and takes 1 if the free cash flow of the companies is above the sample median for the year and 
the price to book ratio is below the sample median for the year; otherwise, SFCF takes 0. 
Control variable proxies 
This research includes a number of control variables in order to reduce their confounding effects. Prior 
researchers have stressed that large companies tend to reduce their results by using accounting 
methods (Nekhili et al., 2016). Company size (CSIZE) is measured using the natural logarithm of the 
company`s total assets (Fakhroni et al., 2018; Jones & Sharma, 2001). Agency theory assumes that 
dividends will reduce the agency problem of free cash flow. Paying dividends to shareholders in the 
situation of excess cash flow may constrain the overinvestments that management makes in NPV 
projects (Jensen, 1986). Following the empirical work of Nekhili et al. (2016) and Noor et al. (2015), the 
current study computes the dividend yield (DIYD) by dividing the dividend per share on the market value 
per share. The return on assets (ROA) is considered to be an indicator for the company`s performance, 
which is included as a control variable in this study. Nekhili et al. (2016) stated that growing performance 
results in increasing the cash flow, and Fakhroni et al. (2018) supported this argument. Thus, ROA is 
calculated in this study as net income scaled by total assets (Al Qallap, 2014; Alzoubi, 2018; Nawaiseh, 
2016). According to Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998), the association between 
absolute value of total accruals (ATAC) and earnings management is significantly negative. The study 
includes ATAC as a control variable measured as absolute value of total accruals divided by lagged 
total assets (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). Finally, the influence of the industry type (IDUS) is controlled in 
this study, where it is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a listed company is under the industrial sector, 
and 0 if the listed company is under the service sector (Alhadab, 2018). 
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In the scholarship, the free cash flow problem is commonly aligned 
with low growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). 
Companies with low growth opportunities and high free cash flow are more 
likely to invest in negative NPV projects that only maximize the wealth of 
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managers while ignoring the interests of shareholders (Habib, 2011; Nouri 
& Gilaninia, 2017). In this way, the current study determines SFCF situation 
by employing two proxies, which are the free cash flow and the growth 
opportunities of the firm identified by price to book ratio (Shadmehri et al., 
2017). The SFCF is a dummy variable and takes 1 if the free cash flow of 
the companies is above the sample median for the year and the price to book 
ratio is below the sample median for the year; otherwise, SFCF takes 0.
Control variable proxies
This research includes a number of control variables in order to 
reduce their confounding effects. Prior researchers have stressed that large 
companies tend to reduce their results by using accounting methods (Nekhili 
et al., 2016). Company size (CSIZE) is measured using the natural logarithm 
of the company`s total assets (Fakhroni et al., 2018; Jones & Sharma, 2001). 
Agency theory assumes that dividends will reduce the agency problem of 
free cash flow. Paying dividends to shareholders in the situation of excess 
cash flow may constrain the overinvestments that management makes in 
NPV projects (Jensen, 1986). Following the empirical work of Nekhili et 
al. (2016) and Noor et al. (2015), the current study computes the dividend 
yield (DIYD) by dividing the dividend per share on the market value per 
share. The return on assets (ROA) is considered to be an indicator for 
the company`s performance, which is included as a control variable in 
this study. Nekhili et al. (2016) stated that growing performance results 
in increasing the cash flow, and Fakhroni et al. (2018) supported this 
argument. Thus, ROA is calculated in this study as net income scaled by 
total assets (Al Qallap, 2014; Alzoubi, 2018; Nawaiseh, 2016). According 
to Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998), the association 
between absolute value of total accruals (ATAC) and earnings management 
is significantly negative. The study includes ATAC as a control variable 
measured as absolute value of total accruals divided by lagged total assets 
(Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). Finally, the influence of the industry type (IDUS) 
is controlled in this study, where it is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a listed 
company is under the industrial sector, and 0 if the listed company is under 
the service sector (Alhadab, 2018).
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data analysis
The study employs panel data analysis. Panel data has many 
advantages compared to purely cross-sectional or purely time-series data 
because it provides much informative data, further variability, minor 
collinearity across the variables, more efficiency, and more degree of 
freedom (Baltagi, 2008). The Regression analysis technique is utilized 
to investigate the relationships between the variables of the study. Initial 
steps were taken before regression analysis. First, the Hausman, Wald, and 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests were used to choose the most 
appropriate estimation method. Then, the assumptions of panel data were 
diagnosed for multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and 
panel unit root. Subsequently, the random-effects model or error components 
model was run, and it is defined in the following equations:
DACit = β1 + β2 SMSit + β3 SFCFit + β4 CSIZEit + β5 DIYDit + β6 ROAit 
+ β7 ATACit + β8 IDUSit + εi + uit
Where:
DAC = Discretionary Accounting Accruals 
SMS = Stock Market Segmentations
SFCF = Surplus Free Cash Flow
CSIZE = Company Size
DIYD = Dividend Yield
ROA = Return on Assets
ATAC = Absolute Value of Total Accruals 
IDUS = Industry
εi = Error component
uit = Combined time series and cross-section error component
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fINdINgS aNd dISCuSSION
descriptive Statistics
This section shows the descriptive statistics through reporting the 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, frequency, and 
percentage values. In Table 1, summary statistics of the sample for both 
continuous and dichotomous variables are provided. Panel A of Table 1 
shows that the mean of the DAC was -0.021 and varied from -0.579 to 
0.567, which implies that on average, the sample companies engaged in 
earnings management downwardly. This is consistent with previous studies 
in Jordan (Alhadab, 2018; Azzoz, Abdel, & Khamees, 2016). The value 
of the CSIZE variable ranged from 12.677 to 21.310 with an average of 
17.196, which is similar to the Jordanian research of Abbadi et al. (2016), 
who found that a mean of the company size was 17.034 with a minimum 
value of 13.060 and a maximum value of 21.292.
The DIYD had a minimum value of 0.000, which means that some 
companies did not pay dividends, the average of DIYD was 2.708, which 
is consistent with Nekhili et al. (2016) who reported an average of dividend 
yield of 2.780 among French companies. The mean of ROA was 1.818, 
which explains how efficient management is employing a firm`s assets in 
order to make a profit. A lower average was reported by Fakhroni et al. 
(2018), which was 0.485. Finally, the mean of ATAC was 0.090 with a 
minimum and maximum value of 0.000 and 2.751, respectively.
Panel B presents the descriptive data of the dichotomous variables. 
40.42 % of the observations were listed in the first market, and 59.58 % of 
them were listed in the other markets (second & third market). This finding 
indicats that much effort from the companies is needed to be listed in the 
first market, and this may be attributed to the earnings condition set by 
ASE. Approximately, 20% of the observations were categorized as having 
the potential for the SFCF agency problem, which is harmonious with the 
percentage reported by Chung et al. (2005) of 19% for listed US firms, 
and Astami et al. (2017) of 24% for companies listed in 9 countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
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Table 1: descriptive statistics of all variables
variable Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel a: Continuous variables
DAC -0.021 -0.018 0.110 -0.579 0.567
CSIZE 17.196 17.180 1.455 12.677 21.310
DIYD 2.708 0.000 3.194 0.000 11.628
ROA 1.818 2.964 13.386 -195.296 38.668
ATAC 0.090 0.058 0.163 0.000 2.751
Panel B: dichotomous variables
frequency Percentage
SMS
Other markets
First Market
192
283
40.42 %
59.58 %
SFCF
Low SFCF
High SFCF
379
96
79.79 %
20.21 %
IDUS
Service Sector
Industrial Sector
230
245
48.42 %
51.58%
Correlation analysis
This section presents the Pearson correlation analysis which was 
used to reveal the size and direction of bivariate correlation among all the 
variables. As shown in Table 2, the correlation coefficients between the 
variables ranged from to -0.500 to 0.394, in which the highest correlation 
was between DIYD and SMS. As expected, the independent variables 
SMS and SFCF were positivity correlated with DAC at the 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively. With respect to the control variables, 
CSIZE had a negative relationship with DAC at the 5% significance level, 
and the ROA had a positive association with earnings management also at 
the 5% significance level. None of the other control variables was highly 
correlated with DAC.
On the other hand, Pearson correlation analysis is able to reveal the 
multicollinearity problems. Based on prior literature, the threshold of ± 
0.80 correlation coefficient between two regressors indicates for possible 
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multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). In this case, as shown in Table 
2, all the correlation coefficients among the independent variables are less 
than the ± 0.80 threshold, which means that the multicollinearity was not a 
serious issue in interpreting the results of the regression model.
Table 2: Bivariate Pearson correlation between variables 
variables daC SMS SfCf CSIZE dIyd ROa aTaC IduS
DAC 1
SMS 0.109 * 1
SFCF 0.173** 0.105* 1
CSIZE -0.107* -0.390** 0.015 1
DIYD 0.023 -0.500** 0.110* 0.206** 1
ROA 0.104* -0.312** 0.056 0.290** 0.394** 1
ATAC -0.020 -0.013 -0.059 0.083 0.016 -0.117* 1
IDUS -0.069 0.086 0.026 -0.161** -0.084 -0.062 -0.002 1
* significance level at P 
0.05, and ** Significance 
level at P 0.01 
univariate analysis
It is recommended to check the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance by conducting the Levene’s test for equality of variances prior to 
the t-test of independent samples (Pallant, 2013). Thus, the Levene’s test 
was performed for the variables SMS and SFCF to see whether the variation 
of scores for the two groups was the same or not. As reported in Table 3, 
the significance level of the Leven`s test was larger than the cut-off of 0.05 
for the variables SMS and SFCF with F (191, 282) = 1.090, F (378, 95) = 
0.868, respectively. This result means that the assumption of equal variances 
was not been violated, and, thus, the independent samples t-test with equal 
variance was selected for those variables.
Table 3: Leven`s tests for equality of variance
variable f value p
SMS 1.090 0.512
SFCF 0.868 0.361
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Table 4 provides the findings of the t-test of independent samples for 
differences in DAC between sub-samples on the basis of SMS and SFCF. 
Panel A illustrates that the mean of earnings management of the sub-sample 
under the other markets (second & third markets) was significantly larger 
than those companies under the first market at the 0.05 level. This result is 
in alignment with the first hypotheses, which suggests that companies listed 
in the second or third markets are more apt to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management to meet the earnings condition of the first market. 
In panel B, the sampled companies with high SFCF had a higher mean 
of DAC than those with low SFCF, where these differences were at the 
0.01 significance level. As expected, managers with a high SFCF situation 
tend to manage reported earnings upwardly, which aligns with the second 
hypothesis.
Table 4: Univariate test differences in DAC between sub-samples
Panel a: SMS Sub-Samples – first Market (SMS = 0) and Other Markets (SMS = 1)
first Market 
(SMS = 0)
Other Markets 
(SMS = 1)
Mean 
Difference t p
Mean of DAC -0.035 -0.011  -0.024 -2.382 0.018
Observations 192 283
Panel B: SfCf Sub-Samples – Low SfCf (SfCf = 0) and high SfCf (SfCf = 1)
Low SfCf 
(SfCf = 0)
high SfCf
(SfCf = 1)
Mean 
Difference t p
Mean of DAC -0.030 0.017 -0.047 -3.812 0.000
Observations 379 96
Multivariate analysis and findings Interpretation
Selecting the estimation method 
In accordance with panel data analysis, the study utilized the Hausman 
test, Wald analysis for testing time-fixed effects, and the Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test to choose the most suitable estimation method. The results of 
Table 5, 6, and 7 show that the random-effects model was superior to the 
fixed-effects and pooled OLS models for the present study.
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Table 5: Hausman Specification Test
variable fixed Coefficients (b)
Random 
Coefficients (B)
Differences 
(b-B) S.E.
SMS 0.044 0.026 0.018 0.019
SFCF 0.046 0.043 0.003 0.013
CSIZE -0.018 -0.010 -0.009 0.024
DIYD 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
ATAC 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.017
IDUS Omitted
Prob>Chi2          1.74 (0.942)
Table 6: Time-fixed effects test
wald Test
f value P value
1.26 0.285
Table 7: Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test
var sd = sqrt(var)
DAC 0.012 0.110
e 0.011 0.103
u 0.001 0.030
Test: Var (u)     = 0
chibar2(01)      = 3.37
Prob> chibar2  = 0.033
Panel data assumptions
Consistent with panel data analysis, there are number of assumptions 
(no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, no autocorrelation, and no panel 
unit root) that must be met prior to performing regression analysis. The 
section below provides the tests of these assumptions:  
Multicollinearity test
Multicollinearity arises when the independent variables in a regression 
model are highly correlated with each other (Kothari, 2004). As previously 
discussed in section 4.2, the Pearson correlation analysis revealed that 
no bivariate correlation among the independent variables exceeded the 
± 0.80 thresholds. However, Sekaran and Bougie (2016) indicated that 
this approach might not be able to effectively detect a multicollinearity 
problem, especially when complex relationships are present among several 
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explanatory variables. Thus, Sekaran and Bougie (2016) recommended 
employing the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance (1/VIF) 
indicators, in which multicollinearity is present if the VIF is more than 10 
and the tolerance value is less than 0.10.
Table 8: Multicollinearity Test
variable Variance Inflation Factor(vIf)
Tolerance value
(1/vIf)
SMS 1.58 0.634
SFCF 1.06 0.946
CSIZE 1.26 0.793
DIYD 1.51 0.661
ROA 1.28 0.782
ATAC 1.03 0.973
IDUS 1.03 0.970
Mean VIF 1.25
The outcome as in Table 8 shows that the maximum VIF among the 
variables was 1.58 which is not greater than 10, and the minimum value of 
the tolerance was 0.634 which is well above the cut-off value of 0.10. As 
a result, all the variables are in the acceptable range, concluding that the 
multicollinearity assumption was not violated.
Heteroscedasticity test
The assumption related to homoscedasticity means that the variance of 
the predictor variables around the regression function is similar (Stockemer, 
2018). Three tests have been used to detect heteroscedasticity. Under these 
tests, the null hypothesis is that the error variances are all constant assuming 
homoscedasticity. As illustrated in Table 9, according to White`s and 
modified Wald tests, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected, 
indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. In contrast, the Breusch-Pagan/
Cook-Weisberg test shows a contradictory result because the probability was 
more than 0.05, leading to the conclusion that the data are homoscedastic. 
In this case, Greene (2007) explains that the Breusch-Pagan has less power 
when the errors are not normally distributed, where it works well for the 
linear forms of heteroscedasticity. White`s test is more generic and could 
be carried out without making any specific assumptions about the nature 
of heteroscedasticity.
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Table 9: heteroscedasticity tests
Tests Chi-Square (2) df p
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test 0.38 1 0.540
White`s Test 190.24 32 0.000
Modified Wald Test for Groupwise 
Heteroscedasticity
4.8e+05 95 0.000
However, the White`s test result as in Table 9 shows that the data 
suffer from the heteroscedasticity problem, where it confirms the result of 
the modified Wald test. Figure 1 provides further evidence that the residuals 
show a pattern against the fitted values, implying heteroscedasticity.
-.50.5Residuals
-.3210.1
Fitte  v lues
Figure 1: Residuals versus fitted values
Accordingly, the current study assumes that the data is heteroscedastic; 
thus, the robust standard errors for random-effects regression was used to 
solve the issue of heteroscedasticity.
Autocorrelation test
One of the most important panel data assumptions is that the error 
terms should be uncorrelated and independently distributed; otherwise, 
a serial correlation problem is present (Field, 2013). An autocorrelation 
problem in panel data leads to obtaining biased standard errors and less 
efficient results (Drukker, 2003). Accordingly, the study used the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in panel data, in which the null hypothesis is that 
there is no first-order autocorrelation. As shown in Table 10, the p value 
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was 0.454, which means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and 
concludes that the assumption of no serial correlation was not violated.
Table 10: autocorrelation test
F df p
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 0.319 1,94 0.573
Panel unit root test
Panel data econometrics focus mainly on the non-stationarity of the 
macro panels with large observations (N) and large length of the time series 
(T) more than the micro panels with large N and small T (Baltagi, 2008). 
Further, if a panel has a small time-series dimension (T) and large cross-
section dimension (N), then conducting the usual panel data procedures is 
recommended (Levin, Lin, & Chu, 2002). Actually, for large time-series 
dimension (T); panel root tests enjoy with a high power, while for small 
time-series dimension (T), these tests have low power and a potential risk 
of assuming that the entire panel is non-stationary although when the panel 
has a large proportion of stationary series (Karlsson & Löthgren, 2000).
Several panel root tests are available with various characteristics and 
assumptions. According to Baltagi (2008), both the Levin-Lin-Chu and 
Im-Pesaran-Shin tests are suitable for macro panels (N=10- 250, and T=5-
25), but they have size distortions and low power for micro panels when N 
is large relative to T, which was the case in the current research (N = 475, 
T= 5). Moreover, Maddala and Wu (1999) found that the Fisher-type test 
suffers from size distortions for a large N. In conclusion, the asymptotic 
properties of the tests mentioned above assume that T trends to infinity, 
which could lead to erroneous inference when the panel data is micro. 
However, Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) and Baltagi (2008) highlighted 
that the Harris-Tzavalis test is suitable for the micro panel with a small T.
Based on the above argument, the Harris-Tzavalis test was used for 
panel roots diagnostics, where the null hypothesis is that the panels contain 
unit roots. In Table 11, the p-value for the all main variables was above the 
significance level, concluding that the panels are stationery at the 0.01 level.
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Table 11: Panel unit root test (harris-Tzavalis)
variables Statistic p
DAC -0.241 0.000
SMS 0.264 0.000
SFCF 0.019 0.000
Outliers and normality
In the current research, outliers were intentionally not removed because 
observations with extreme values of DAC may comprise management 
discretion. Eliminating either the highest positive or negative observations 
might lead to exclude earnings management cases that are the focus of this 
study (Alzoubi, 2018). Thus, outliers may provide convincing evidence of 
earnings management.
With regard to the normality assumption, four different tests were 
executed, where the null hypotheses of these tests were that the data were 
normally distributed. As shown in Table 12, the Skewness/Kurtosis, Jarque-
Bera, Shapiro-Wilk W, and Shapiro-Francia W’ tests indicate a departure 
from normality. The small p-values of all the tests suggest rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the residuals have a normal distribution.
Table 12: Normality tests
Test p
Skewness/Kurtosis 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.000
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.000
Shapiro-Francia W’ 0.000
In conjunction with prior numerical tests, Figures 2, 3 and 4 provide 
graphical methods to assess the normality. In Figure 2, the frequency 
histogram is not perfectly bell-shaped, some deviations from the normal 
curve are present. Figure 3 shows that the observed values do not fall entirely 
along the straight line of the expected values. Finally, as shown in Figure 4, 
the probability plots indicate that most error terms are not close enough to 
the diagonal line. Nevertheless, dots in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are not very 
distant from the normal distribution line.
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In this vein, Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) and Field (2013) argued that 
if large data sets with more than 200 observations give rise to minor standard 
errors, then criterion should not be applied because the null hypothesis is 
likely to be rejected from even minor deviations from normality. Gujarati 
and Porter (2009) pointed out that in a large sample (N>100) the normality 
assumption may not be a critical issue, in which the assumption that the 
error term has a normal distribution could be still valid. In accordance with 
the central limit theorem, the distribution of the data can be ignored with 
a large sample of more than 100 observations, where the distribution of 
the sample tends to be normal in any case (Altman & Bland, 1995; Field, 
2013; Mishra et al., 2019).
Based on the above discussion, the current research investigated data 
form a large sample; thus, the deviation from normality may be negligible 
with such a sample size, and this deviation may not affect the findings.
The Robust Standard Errors for Random-effects Regression
This section presents the regression analysis utilized to test this study’s 
hypotheses. Based on the reported findings of different tests reported before, 
the most appropriate estimation method is the random-effects model. Further, 
Given that the absence of homoscedasticity, Huber-White’s sandwich 
standard errors was used in this study as a reliable solution in order to be 
robust against the heteroscedasticity issue, and to obtain unbiased standard 
errors of the regression coefficients (Froot, 1989; Wooldridge, 2010).
Table 13 reports that the F value of the model is significant at the 0.01 
level, which means that the results as a whole are statistically significant. 
The model showed that the predictor variable SMS was positively and 
significantly related to DAC at the 0.10 level, suggesting that the association 
between SMS and DAC was positive and significant. This finding means 
that companies listed in other markets (second and third markets) are more 
apt to opt income-boosting DAC. Here, a boost in reported earnings may 
lead these companies to achieve the earnings criteria of the first market so 
that they can then transfer their shares to that market. This result aligns 
with Hypothesis 1.
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The result of the random-effects model indicated that SFCF had a 
positive and significant association with DAC at the 0.01 level. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 2. That is, companies with a high SFCF are more 
likely to manage their reported profits upwardly to conceal the results of 
their non-optimal investments in negative NPV projects. The regression 
finding corroborates the univariate finding presented in Table 4. Prior 
research that showed consistent results of the SFCF and income-increasing 
DAC are Chung et al. (2005), Nekhili et al. (2016), Sharma, Sharma, and 
Ananthanarayanan (2011), and Bhundia (2012). 
Table 13: The Robust standard errors for random-effects regression
variable
Random-Effectse Regression
Coefficient z value
Intercept 0.129 1.73*
SMS 0.026 1.87*
SfCf 0.042 3.00***
CSIZE -0.010 -2.45**
dIyd 0.001 0.44
ROa 0.001 3.13***
aTaC -0.001 -0.02
IduS -0.020 -1.83*
R-squared 0.075
f-statistics 
(p-value)
45.12***
N 475
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance level at 0.1, .05, and 0.01 respectively.
In respect of the control variables, the coefficient of the CSIZE had a 
negative sign and significant at the 0.05 level as predicted by El Moslemany 
and Nathan (2019). This means that the size of the firm was negatively 
related to DAC, and this could be justified by the fact that big firms are 
less apt to engage in earnings management as they are under pressure 
from investors and financial analysts. The ROA variable had a positive 
and significant impact on DAC at the 0.01 level, meaning that companies 
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with high ROA were more likely to manage their reported earnings. This 
is contrary to some studies conducted in Jordan. For example,  E. Alzoubi 
(2016) offered evidence that ROA was significantly and negatively related to 
DAC, while Al Qallap (2014) found no significant relationship between ROA 
and earnings management. IDUS variable was negatively and significantly 
associated with DAC, which indicates that companies under the industrial 
sector had a lower positive DAC than those companies categorized under 
the service sector. Similar findings are also shared by Abed et al. (2012), 
who reported a negative and significant association between industrial 
companies and DAC in Jordan. 
The results of the control variables, DIYD and ATAC were not related 
to DAC. For the DIYD variable, the result had a positive but insignificant 
relationship with DAC. This result was Unlike Noor et al. (2015), who 
observed that dividend payment is significantly increased the levels of 
DAC. For the ATAC variable, the sign of the coefficient was negative 
but insignificant. This was unlike Becker et al. (1998), who discovered a 
negative and significant relationship between ATAC and DAC, while Nouri 
and Gilaninia (2017) found that the ATAC was positively and significantly 
related to DAC.
Finally, the finding of the regression model reported an R square 
of 0.075 for DAC, leading to the conclusion that all the independent and 
control variables explained about 7.5% of the change in the dependent 
variable. As well, the F statistic of the model was significant at the 0.01 
level, which provides sufficient evidence that the regression model fits the 
data of the study well.
CONCLuSIONS
The earnings management phenomenon remains controversial, but this 
phenomenon is an interesting field of research but lacks reference on 
Jordanian context. From the incentive perspective, two variables deserve 
attention in Jordan that may lead management to manipulate their reported 
earnings, which make the current study original and valuable. The results 
found a significant and positive relationship between earnings management 
and SFCF. As well, the results provided conclusive evidence that SMS was 
significantly and positively associated with earnings manipulation.  
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The results of this study provide valuable information for several 
parties. For government policy-makers and regulators in the ASE, the study 
found that companies listed in the other markets (second and third markets) 
are more likely to choose for income-increasing DAC than companies listed 
in the first market. To emphasize, the findings of studying the managerial 
behaviour towards the segmentation of the stock market in the ASE provide 
them with clues to handle the positive DAC that may resulted from the 
earnings-based criteria of the first market. For shareholders and investors, 
the earnings figure is the most potent aspect of the decision-making process 
that depends mainly on the financial statements (Barkhordar & Tehrani, 
2016; Tutino & Pompili, 2018). Since earnings management practices 
distort these reports, the results of the study may assist shareholders and 
investors to grasp those unpleasant practices. Notably, the study documents 
that the SFCF situation leads management to opt income-boosting DAC, 
and shows how the free cash flow holding by the low growth companies 
harm the interests of shareholders and investors. This will make them 
more cautious when they are making investment decisions and when they 
sell or buy the shares of a particular company. For external auditors, the 
results may function as a guide for these auditors who audit the financial 
statements of the listed companies. The study reveals new situations that 
lead management to manipulate the reported earnings. Accordingly, the 
study recommends that external auditors pay an extra attention to those 
companies that are applying to move up to the first market and also to low 
growth firms with high free cash flow.
Despite the substantial contribution of the present study, it has a 
twofold limitation. First, this study included five control variables and 
there are some other control variables which were not utilized in the current 
empirical study. This means that some variables that could influence the 
levels of the DAC in the sample of the study which were not examined. This 
study did not use causality tests. For example, Gujarati and Porter (2009) 
mentioned that the regression analysis technique deals with the dependence 
of a particular variable on other ones, where the causation cannot logically 
be implied. Therefore, the reported findings provide evidence for only for 
relationships between the positive DAC and the attributes of the independent 
variables instead of causality. Second, in the earnings management literature, 
there are number of accrual-based models to estimate DAC, and there is 
no consensus in previous empirical work about any particular model. This 
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may lead to inconsistency between the results of the model used in this 
study and the prior studies.
Several recommendations can be considered for future research. The 
replication of the research methodology of this study in other countries is 
encouraged to determine the consistency in empirical results of the same 
variables among different contexts that have different environments and 
legal systems. This allows other countries to better understand the earnings 
management phenomenon and to examine important factors that may lead 
to earnings management. This study introduced SMS variable for the first 
time in the literature. Thus, one strong recommendation is to discover 
another measurement of this variable in future research. Likewise, the study 
employed the modified Jones model to reveal earnings manipulation. Future 
research may consider different accrual models to enrich the framework 
of the current research. Finally, it would be useful and an opportunity for 
future scholars to investigate the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the links between SMS, SFCF, and earnings management in Jordan.
Overall, this study is the first of its kind for both developed and 
developing economies that have studied the association between SMS and 
earnings management. In Jordan, this study extends previous research by 
examining the impact of SFCF on income-increasing DAC in the non-
financial companies listed on ASE.
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